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THE PAST – SHUTTLE 
PROGRAM (1981-2011)
NASA has experience with manned spaceflight since 
its’ first manned mission in 1961. 
Unique position of having over 50 years of experience 
with getting humans to space and exploring, providing 
analysts with a proven track record of:
• Developed training programs (crew, console, operations and ground 
support)
• Implementation of consistent process and program reviews and 
technical assessments
• Developed assessment criteria and methods to analyze and assess 
capabilities and safety
• Process to provide information and support before, during and after 
a Mission
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Shuttle HRA Program
• HRA Program Development
• Shuttle had years of flight experience and detailed 
information available 
• Screening Methodology
• Detailed Methodology
• Why This Worked for Shuttle
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The Present:  ORION Vehicle 
(2016)
• Current Situation – Preliminary Design Phase
• Using NASA Program and Organizational 
Experience
• Performing the Assessment
• Screening 
• Detailed
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Past versus Present
Differences Screening Detailed
Past (Shuttle) Time, Environment & 
Stress Conditions Known
Design, Cabin Layouts, 
Processes & Procedures 
Available and Verified with 
Years of Experience
Present (Orion) • Analyses, Preliminary 
Designs & Model 
Simulations Available 
for Current Program.
• Generic History & 
Experience to Draw 
From.
• Analyses, Preliminary 
Designs & Model 
Simulations Available 
for Current Program.
• Generic History & 
Experience to Draw 
From.
5
The Future – Challenges and 
Solutions
Problem Why This a Problem Solution Acceptability
Available 
Information
Concept and requirement 
documents allow multiple paths 
for success and limits available 
specifics.
Using past experience For the areas identified, it is unlikely that 
NASA operations will change what years of 
development and experience have shown as 
effective. 
Identify potential 
failure significant 
HE 
Multiple ways to cause failure 
based on many different 
permutations of events (too 
many “what ifs”).
Using past experience 
identify single action 
that would cause 
failure.
At this point in program the Risk values are 
high level estimates, so using the human 
action that must occur for success or failure 
provides a reasonable estimate.
Manpower/ 
Resources
Always limited. Screening vs. detailed Concentrating on high risk contributors is 
more effective use.
Assumptions  Consistency between 
programs
 Reasonableness
 Most probable 
development of events
Using past experience Provides basis for rationale and results.
How conservative Major risk contributors need to 
be defensible to ensure resources 
versus reward
Screening vs. detailed Each method provides a conservative 
estimate.
Using the Results Interpretation. Integrate into program 
reviews.
Inform management and reviewers of 
potential risk concerns.
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Summary
• A human reliability assessments performed early 
in a program is a starting point 
• Assumptions and surrogate data can only be 
proven correct or appropriate as assumptions 
become reality  
• Any changes or modifications in design, process 
or procedure can affect results 
• Rationales based on NASA’s unique history and 
experience may not be applicable to other 
industries
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